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Constitution-making is a popular but poorly understood concept. There are 
many speculations about the impact of different design processes on 
constitutional outcomes. Much of the debate reduces to the question of who is 
involved in the process and for what intent? We consider two central issues 
in this regard. The first is the problem of institutional self-dealing, or 
whether governmental organs that have something to gain from the 
constitutional outcome should be involved in the process. The second deals 
with the impact of public involvement in the process. Both of these concerns 
have clear normative implications and both are amenable to straightforward 
social scientific analysis. This study surveys the relevant research on 
constitution-making, describes the conceptual issues involved in 
understanding constitution-making, reviews some claims regarding the 
process of constitution-making, and presents a set of baseline empirical 
results from a new set of data on the content and process of constitution-
making. 
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Introduction 
To adequately appreciate the dynamic of constitution-making in Nigeria, it 
will be useful to look briefly into the history of constitutionalism. That 




 centuries. John Locke, like most 
political philosophers of his time, started his theory of the state with a 
consideration of man‘s state of nature. Accordingly, in his Treaties of 
Government (1690), he held the view that man originally lived according to 
the laws of nature. Following Hobbes‘ argument that life in the state of 
nature is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short, Locke described it as a state 
of peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, and preservation. He noted that the 
state of nature is not a state of war. He therefore distinguished between the 
two thus; ―Men living together according to reason without a common 
superior on earth with authority to judge between them is properly the state 
of nature‖ and ―… force exercised without right, creates a state of war, 
because it contributes to a violation of the state of nature, that is, of what it 
ought to be‖ (Locke, 2009). 
Locke‘s state of nature is characterized by the lack of some basic 
fundamentals he calls ‗wants.‘ These include, the want of an established 
‗known laws‘, the want of an impartial judge, and executive power to enforce 
just decisions. Proceeding from this, men unanimously consented to enter 
into a social compact that created a government for the purpose of protecting 
their natural rights. But the only right they surrendered was to enforce the 
law. Government in this manner was based on the consent of the governed. 
Those who govern are bound to observe the terms of the compact. 
Locke saw the ills of vesting absolute power on one person or a group of 
persons. From the account of his experience of the abuse of such powers by 
monarchs in his time, he set a limit on the power to be entrusted on 
government. But it must exercise its supremacy through laws properly 
promulgated and applying equally to all groups and classes. Locke (2009) in 
enunciating the principles of separation of powers as a way of limiting the 
government spoke of ―balancing the power of government by placing several 
parts of it in different hands.‖ 
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In Lockean society, the people still retained sovereign power, not the 
government. The people‘s power is supreme but is latent. Locke recognizes 
the power of revolution which is vested in the people. If rulers do not 
exercise their trust in the interest of the governed, then resistance is 
justifiable and a new government may be instituted. The dissolution of 
government can take place while society still remains intact. 
Another Philosopher who provided a theoretical framework for 
constitutionalism was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. According to him, all 
individual citizens are merged into an all-powerful sovereign in whom 
inheres the expression of the general will. ‗The general will in this instance 
cannot be wrong so far it is the will of all.‘ Rousseau‘s task from this 
indication was to provide the legitimacy of government through universal 
participation in legislation. Men for Rousseau were free. This accounts for 
his emphasis on the individual will, individual reason and individual liberty. 
Thus, ―sovereignty is claimed for the many, not for the few, the state must 
exercise power not for itself but its members‖ (Chappell, 1994). 
A basic import of the above view of Rousseau is the question of popular 
involvement in constitution-making. It is this substantive requirement if met 
that ensures that the people craft a constitution for themselves- one that they 
will identify as their own. It is a constitution that is a product of a popular 
participation that will stand the test of time and not susceptible to the 
vagaries of temporary majorities (Citizens Convention, 1995). This raises the 
question of what is a constitution. A conceptual understanding of constitution 
is that it is a system of laws, customs, and conventions which define the 
composition and powers of the state, and regulate the relations of the various 
state organs to one another and to the private citizen (Joye and Igweike, 
1982). 
Conceptual framework 
In any well constituted democracy, the National Assembly, elected on the 
basis of universal adult suffrage in free and fair elections should embody the 
sovereign will of the people (Jennings, 1967). In normal circumstances, 
therefore, constitutional reforms and other forms of law reform are 
dominated by the legislature. In the past, the conventional pattern has been 
for government to appoint a Constitutional Review Committee to review 
existing constitutional documents. Usually the terms of reference are 
determined by the government in power-the appointing authority. After 
periods of soliciting and collating the views of the people, through oral and 
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written submissions, the committee then submits its recommendations, to the 
government (Inquiries Act). The grouse against this process has been 
precisely that the people have no control over the end product. The 
government of the day choose and accept what suits it, lending credence to 
the view that the government of the day abused their temporary majorities in 
government to push through constitutional reform to suit their own parochial 
interests. The history of constitution-making in Nigeria especially, the 1979, 
1989 and 1999 constitutions attest to this sad pattern of constitutional 
development. Against the preceding background, it becomes instructive to 
reflect on what is meant by popular involvement. What form should it take? 
Who should participate and how? What frame(s) should it take? 
In attempting to proffer solution to these questions, we will draw instances 
from the processes of constitution making and emerging jurisprudence 
from the South African Constitutional Court. These two constitute the 
bulwark of our conceptual framework. 
A constitution is an act of the people if it is made by 
them either directly in a  referendum or through a 
convention or constituent assembly popularly elected for 
this purpose, subject or not to formal ratification by the 
people in referendum (Nwabueze, 1982). 
Within the context of the quote, constitution-making does not refer to the 
act of promulgation. Instead, it expresses the relationship existing between 
especially the systems of government, and the individual. If a constitution 
is agreed upon and accepted by the people in a referendum or through a 
constituent assembly, it is truly a representation of the people‘s act. The 
people‘s act in this sense becomes the consent of mathematical aggregate 
of the general will. This follows from the fact that all the people cannot 
vote in a referendum, for example, the under aged. Likewise, only true 
representatives of the people popularly elected by them can take part in the 
deliberations of a constituent assembly. In some cases, the referendum or 
constituent assembly precedes executive or legislative action and in others 
it is a ratification of an executive or legislative act. What this means is that 
promulgation is only a formal act, which should not detract from the 
popular consent.  
In any well constituted democracy, the referendum or a constituent 
assembly needs to be preceded by a wide range of constitutional proposals. 
All the populace cannot take part in deliberations of a constituent 
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assembly. It becomes pertinent therefore that the terms of reference of the 
constituent assembly should be determined through an election specifically 
organized for that purpose. This situation calls for the electorate to 
properly understand that they are voting to authorize the adoption of a 
constitution on their behalf. Any configuration short of this is not a genuine 
reflection of the popular will. 
In two recent judgments, the Constitutional Court had had occasion to 
adumbrate on the nature and scope of the duty to facilitate public 
involvement in the law-making process. In the first of these cases (case 
CCT/2/,2005) Doctors for Life International Vs the Speaker of the National 
Assembly and others. The Court concluded that the proper approach was as 
follows: 
The duty to facilitate public involvement must be construed 
in the context of our constitutional democracy, which 
embraces the principle of participation and consultation…, 
Undoubtedly, this obligation may be fulfilled in different 
ways and is open to innovation on the part of the 
legislatures. In the end, however, the duty to facilitate 
public involvement will often require Parliament … to 
provide citizens with a meaningful opportunity to be heard 
in the making of the laws that will govern them. Our 
Constitution demands no less. In determining whether 
Parliament has complied with its duty to facilitate public 
participation in a particular case, the court will consider 
what Parliament has done in that case. The question will be 
whether what Parliament has done is reasonable in all the 
circumstances. And factors relevant to determining 
reasonableness would include rules, if any, adopted by 
Parliament to facilitate public participation, the nature of 
the legislation under consideration, and whether the 
legislation needed to be enacted urgently. Ultimately, what 
Parliament must determine in each case is what methods of 
facilitating public participation would be appropriate. In 
determining whether what Parliament has done is 
reasonable, this court will pay respect to what Parliament 
has assessed as being the appropriate level of scrutiny of 
Parliament‘s duty to facilitate public involvement, the 
Court must balance, on the one hand, the need to respect 
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parliamentary institutional autonomy, and on the other, the 
right of the public to participate in the public affairs. In my 
view, this balance is best struck by this Court considering 
whether what Parliament does in each case is reasonable 
(Case CCT/2/05, at paras 145-6). 
The Court (Doctor for Life, 2006), went on to hold that there are at least 
two aspects of the duty to facilitate public participation and said: 
What is ultimately important is that the legislature has 
taken steps to afford the public a reasonable opportunity 
to participate effectively in the law-making process. 
Thus-construed, there are at least two aspects of the duty 
to facilitate public involvement. The first is the duty to 
provide meaningful opportunities for public participation 
in the law-making process. The second is the duty to take 
measures to ensure that people have the ability to take 
advantage of the opportunities provided. In this sense, 
public involvement may be seen as ―a continuum that 
ranges from providing information and building 
awareness, to partnering in decision-making. 
Sachs, J. (Sachs, J.2006, in Doctors for Life, 228), who agreed with the 
majority but for different reasons percipiently observed that although 
regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government are 
fundamental to a constitutional democracy they were not exhaustive of it. 
He went on to articulate a vision of 
 a permanently engaged citizenry alerted to and involved 
with all legislative programmes. The people have more 
than the right to vote in periodic elections, fundamental 
though that is. And more is guaranteed to them than the 
opportunity to object to legislation before and after it is 
passed, and to criticize it from the sidelines while it is 
being adopted. They are accorded the right on an 
ongoing basis and in a very direct manner, to be (and to 
feel themselves to be) involved in the actual processes of 
law-making. Elections are of necessity periodical … 
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The learned Judge further observed that it would be a travesty to treat 
democracy as going into a deep sleep after elections, only to be kissed back 
to short spells of life every five years. 
Sachs noted with approval that there was a growing trend globally to ―see 
constant public involvement in law-making not only as integrally bound to 
representative democracy, but as an important contributor to its 
revitalization. He quoted, with approval, a recent report in Britain 
concerning what was seen as a growing trend in that country towards 
disengagement by the public from formal democratic politics. The report 
observed that public re-engagement with formal democracy was vital to 
avoid: 
- … the weakening of the mandate and legitimacy for elected 
governments because of plummeting turnouts‖;   
- the further weakening of political equality because whole section 
of the community feel estranged from politics; 
- the weakening of effective recruitment into politics; 
- the rise of undemocratic political forces; and 
- the rise of what the report calls ―quiet authoritarianism‖ within 
government (Rountree, 2006). 
We have quoted extensively from these recent developments to show that 
Nigerians are not alone in demanding their involvement in crafting their own 
constitution. It is their participation that would produce a sacred compact, 
they would call their own, one which articulate their ―shared aspirations and 
the values which would bind them and which would discipline their 
government and its national institutions‖ (Mwanakative, 
http://www.post.co.zm).  
Methodology 
The method which we adopt for this study is that of exposition, conceptual 
clarification and critical analysis. Traits of the analytical explanation of 
philosophy would also be pursued in order to bring it to bear on aspects of 
the study that so requires. The underlying methodological framework is 
ideational. And this is expository, critical, analytical, and even historical. It is 
a method of investigation deriving from the idealist articulation of the 
character of phenomenon in general (including social phenomenon).  
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There are a number of methodological frameworks which may be pursued 
to understand social reality such as constitutional development. We may 
for instance, adopt the idealist or the materialist framework. However, the 
adoption of any framework requires that we justify our rejection of the 
other. Our chosen methodological framework shall them give a guided 
excursion into the conceptual entailments of our operative concepts by 
posing them as critique of the status quo. 
In line with most philosophical expositions, the data used for this study 
were derived from secondary sources and through the existent 
constitutional realities in Nigeria. Part materials from this source include; 
products of extensive review of related literatures, books, and journal 
articles. In this regard, the position advanced by this study is not based on 
any research instrument. Despite this, the materials and methods used in 
this research are relevant and reliable to the extent that their prognosis 
approximates various expressions of constitution-making in Nigeria. 
Contradictions of constitution-making in Nigeria 
Following the outlined perspective of the processes of constitution-making, 
Nigeria‘s current constitution (1999) as has been the case with previous ones 
(1979/1989), is an act of the federal military government. It did not follow 
the outlined processes of a people‘s constitution and was also not adopted by 
them in a referendum. As has been the case with all military organized 
constitutions in Nigeria, there was a constituent assembly established by 
constituent assembly decree. The composition of the constituent body is 
usually made up of persons appointed by the military government. For 
instance, the 1988 constituent assembly consisted of a chairman, a deputy 
chairman appointed by the government. Other membership included 450 
members who were not directly elected by the people but through electoral 
colleges formed by the local government councils, which themselves did not 
have the mandate of the people. Another 111 were government nominated 
members. The composition of the constituent assembly as shown above 
clearly reveals that the constitution adopted by government was not on behalf 
of the people. To buttress this point, we use the speech of the self-styled 
Military President in which he said that aspirants to the constituent assembly 
would be screened and the decree establishing it will contain previsions that 
will ―discourage extremists in our body politic‖ (This-Week, 1988). He 
(Babangida) further said that ―no community should send bench-warmers, 
and … those whose traits are extremism or fanaticism of any kind.‖ 
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The point of departure here is that it is the people on their own who should 
decide the sort of constitution they need, and which kind of people to 
produce it. If the forward to the constitution (1999) would be ―we the people 
… do hereby make enact and give to ourselves the following constitution,‖ 
then the people and the people alone should be left to decide their fate. In 
reference to the President‘s speech, if their choice is an ‗extremist,‘ a ‗bench-
warmer,‘ or ‗fanatic,‘ then they should go ahead and make one. It is their 
daily lives that the constitution would affect. In any case, what is at the heart 
of the demands of the polity is a people driven process through a widely 
constituted Constituent Assembly so as to guarantee ownership and 
legitimacy of the constitution. It is in this respect that a constitution 
according to Jennings (1967) is ―an organization of men and women. Its 
character depends upon the character of the people engaged in governing and 
being governed…‖ 
Contrary to this, what appears missing, largely on the part of government, is 
the realization that electoral democracy and popular involvement are 
mutually reinforcing. For as the South African Constitutional Court has 
succinctly observed: 
General elections, the foundation of representative 
democracy, would be meaningless without massive 
participation by the voters. The participation by the public 
on a continuous basis provides vitality to the functioning of 
representative democracy. It encourages citizens of the 
country to be actively involved in public affairs, identify 
themselves with the institutions of government and to 
become familiar with the law‘s as they are made. It 
enhances the civic dignity of those who participate by 
enabling their voices to be heard and taken into account. It 
promotes a spirit of democratic and pluralistic 
accommodation calculated to produce laws that are likely 
to be widely accepted and effective in practice. It 
strengthens the legitimacy of legislation in the eyes of the 
people. Finally, because of its open and public character, it 
acts as a counterweight to secret lobbying and influence 
peddling. Participatory democracy is of special importance 
to those who are relatively disempowered… (Mbao, 2007). 
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The government has no monopoly of political wisdom. It ought to reflect 
and respect the sovereign will of the people. It is therefore, necessary that 
there be broad consensus on the modalities of adopting a constitution. The 
demand and struggle of the people are not limited to the process alone. The 
substance of the constitution should also be agreed to in such a way as to 
embody the sovereign will of the people, which includes a broad range of 
fundamental issues.  
Legitimacy 
A very important aspect of constitution-making apart from the mandate of 
the constituent assembly established to draw up the constitutional 
proposals is the issue of legal power. Part of the mandate of that assembly 
includes; the role of drafting constitutional proposals for the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. The implication of this provision according to 
Nwabueze (1982), is that the ―assembly had no power to decide the 
substantive content of the constitution.‖ The only power it had was to make 
recommendation, which could be accepted or rejected by the government. 
By this act, the assembly was reduced to the level of a mere deliberative 
body, with no power to take decisions on the form and content of the 
constitution. 
A tacit implication of this is that, the federal military government made the 
1999 constitution by status like the previous ones of 1979 and 1989 
respectively. This suggests why many amendments were made by the then 
Armed Forces Ruling Council. Against this phenomenon, Nwabueze 
observes that: ―The mere fact of a substantive amendment, as district from 
a purely formal one, seems irrespective of its nature or importance, to have 
eroded the basis of the people.‖ 
The hypocrisy of this orientation is that the structural forms of the 
government have remained as they were approved by the constituent 
assembly; the charges resulting from the amendments are those that have to 
do with the material well of the entire polity. 
The content of the Nigerian constitution exhibits anti-grass root and 
therefore anti-people tendency. This is expressed in a conceptual argument 
as to whether the people, acting either in a referendum or through 
constituent assembly possess the legal capacity to adopt a constitution and 
restore its validity as law? This question arose out of the contention that 
law-making is a function only of a political community, and not the people 
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in their mass. It further holds that only a people organized as a political 
community can enact laws through the machinery of the state. In this 
regard, it is proper for the people to constitute themselves into a political 
community. But a constituent act of this sort through which a constitution 
is established is purely a political act, giving the constitution only a 
political existence different from a legal one. According to Nwabueze, ―if 
it is intended that the constitution should also be a law, then it is for the 
resultant political creation, the state, to enact it as such through its regular 
procedure for law-making.‖ 
This view disregards the notion that the state is a creation of the people by 
means of a constitution. The state on its part derives its power of law-
making from the people. So, the people who constitute and grant this 
power can act directly through a referendum or otherwise, to give the 
constitution its character and the force of law. This point goes on to explain 
why the lawness of a constitution as a country‘s legal order should not 
depend upon its enactment through the law-making processes of the state. 
It should instead depend upon its recognition as such by the people to be 
governed by it. 
A discernible conclusion from the above analysis is the need for a 
constitution to be adopted by the people. The importance of this is revealed 
by the fact that the legitimacy of the constitution depends on the people‘s 
consent. But we should note that it is an elected (not nominated) 
constituent assembly that can give legitimacy to a constitution (Eresia-Eke, 
1992). Contrary to this and with particular reference to the 1989 
constitution, the then Chief of General Staff, Augustus Aikhomu (March 
31, 1988), in his press briefing with media executives said; 
in addition to elected members of the constituent 
assembly, there will be other persons of well-proven 
integrity and patriotic commitments to represent critical 
interest which would include labour, youth, the 
universities, women and so on, who may not be 
adequately represented through the electoral process. 
These persons would be nominated by government. 
This is an example of anti-democratic and anti-grass root trait in 
constitution-making in Nigeria. When a constitutional document is 
perceived to be anti-grass root, it fails to command the loyalty, obedience 
and confidence of the people. This means that it is illegitimate. The 
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illegitimacy of constitutions accounts for failures of many constitutional 
governments. It leads also to lack of respect for the constitution among the 
populace. When the constitution fails to provide the necessary regulatory 
framework, politics is played according to the whims and caprices of the 
politicians. 
One other way of securing legitimacy is for a constitution to be properly 
understood by the people. It may then be acceptable to them. It is therefore 
important that a constitution be put through a process of popularization. 
Popularization helps to generate public interest in the constitution as well 
as an attitude that everybody has a stake in it- the common property of all. 
Without the sense of a total involvement, a constitution will remain remote 
and artificial to the people. Further, if the final act of adoption is that of the 
entire polity, that may conceivably enhance the legitimacy of the 
constitution by; 
fostering among the people a feeling that the constitution 
is their own, and not an imposition by the government, 
and that they thus have a stake, a responsibility, in 
observing  its rules (Nwabueze). 
This would also serve to give meaning and reality to the phrase ―we the 
people … do hereby make enact and give to ourselves the following 
constitution.‖ 
Supremacy of the constitution 
Adoption of the constitution is important in that it provides the framework 
for the supremacy of the constitution. This supremacy rests on the 
authority of the people as the source and donor of all political power in the 
state. In this way, constitution compels greater obedience when it is 
recognized as a superior law by the people. The persistent call for a 
constitution to be adopted by the people according to Eze (1984), serves to 
correct the erroneous view held by African leaders that the power to 
govern embraces power to enact a new constitution. 
In holding this common view, they lose sight of the fact that a government 
has no more that a limited mandate to govern according the constitution 
under which it took office. When a mode of government has been 
instituted, and a group of rulers is elected to govern under it, the right to 
change the system under a new constitution remains with the people. Just 
like the right to choose the rulers were organized around the people. Any 
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attempt by government to assume the right of the people amounts to 
usurpation. 
In Nigeria, this denial of the people‘s right has persisted for a long time. 
Throughout the colonial period, constituent power remained the exclusive 
preserve of the colonial masters. This power was jealously guarded to 
enable them dictate the pace of constitutional advance. With the 
achievement of independence, the situation was inherited by the Nigerian 
elites who are all out to protect and maintain the status quo. A further 
usurpation of the people‘s constituent power was reproduced in the 1966 
coup. The effect of the coup on the right of the people was to destroy the 
existing constitution, and replaced it with a new one, based on the authority 
(decree) of the coup-makers. Thus, the return to civil rule in 1979 was an 
opportunity for the people of the country to exercise their right to adopt a 
constitution for themselves. Regrettably, however, the opportunity was 
ruined by the method adopted by the Federal Military Government in 
constituting the constituent assembly and by its arrogation of supreme 
power to amend in many significant respects, the decisions of the 
assembly. This phenomenon was repeated in the cases of the 1989 and 
1999 Nigerian constitutions respectively. 
As part of the inherent contradictions in our constitution, we highlight the 
issue of justiciability of the provision of the constitution. A constitution is a 
mode of organizing a state and its government. This definition relates to a 
constitution as a political charter. It is in this understanding that it is a body 
of fundamental principles according to which a state is organized. The 
emphasis here is on authority and sanction which are primarily political. 
This is the approach adopted by those who drafted our constitution 
(members of the constituent assembly). Another is the legal aspect of the 
constitution, especially, as it concerns the objectives and directive 
principles of government. This gives us the idea why the constituent 
assembly considered the appropriate function of the constitution to be that 
of a political charter of government. And this consists of declaration of 
objectives or directive principles of government and a description of the 
organs of government in terms that import no enforceable legal restraints. 
A constitution of this nature exhibits its political existence only. Its 
provisions are political, not legal serving just to exhort, to direct and 
inspire governmental action. It also bestows on the actions, the stamp of 
The Contradictions of Constitution-Making in Nigeria 
 
Copyright © IAARR 2012: www.afrrevjo.net  89 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
legitimacy. Writing about the non-enforceability of French ‗Third 
Republic‘ constitution, Dicey (1974), held that: 
… the restrictions it placed on the action of the 
legislature are not in reality laws, since they are not rules 
which in the last resort will be enforced by the courts. 
Their true character is that of maxims of political 
morality, which derive whatever strength they possess 
from being formally inscribed in the constitution, and 
from the resulting support of public opinion. 
From the foregoing, therefore, inasmuch as the judicial enforcement is an 
inexorable criterion of lawness, there exists a contradiction in a command 
being legal and yet not judicially enforceable. The Nigerian 1979, 1989, 
and 1999 constitutions have this character. They possess the capacity of 
being a law, but certain aspects of it are not justiciable. The judicial 
enforcement is excluded, such as the fundamental objectives and directive 
principles of state policy. This prevailing state of affairs accounts for 
reason the directive principles are no more than ideals which the nation 
anticipates. They are merely ideals which, to realize, ―the citizen can only 
pray and hope for, but in respect of which he can hope for no assistance 
whatsoever from the courts‖ (Aguda, 1983). 
Conclusion 
The point of departure in this study as already stated is that no country can 
afford to trust temporary majority with the constitution-making process. By 
drawing on the emerging jurisprudence from South Africa whose own 
transition to a constitutional democracy has been commended, we have 
been able to show that constitution-making is a painful process which 
cannot be left to one segment of society. The demand is for a document 
which the people will identify as emanating from them, not one imposed 
on them by the ruling elites. In order to adopt a constitution through a 
people driven process, government and the progressive forces in the 
country need to agree on that process. Again, there is also the need to agree 
on the procedures and guiding principles. Enabling legislation must be 
enacted to create the Constituent Assembly.  Such legislation must spell 
out the composition of that body. How are the delegates to be elected/ 
designated? These and other such measures would ensure that the 
constitution which would emerge from the process would be a beacon of 
hope for Nigeria anchored on the values of openness, responsiveness, 
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accountability, equity and inclusiveness, popular participation and fidelity 
to the rule of law. 
A constitution exhibits the political and legal existence. When any of these 
aspects is lacking, it ceases to be an ideal constitution. Our constitutions 
had always shown this lack emphasizing only the political aspect. This is 
so because, its pre-occupation has been to only exhort, direct and inspire 
governmental actions. It also bestows on the actions, the stamp of 
authority. Following this trend, the legal aspect of the constitution is 
carefully excluded. This is explained in the non-justiciability of the 
fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy, and the 
fundamental rights as contained in chapters two and four of the 1999 
Nigerian constitution respectively. And this situation has prevailed because 
the temporary majority has always excluded the rest of the polity from 
active involvement in the processes of constitution-making. Rather than the 
people deciding the content of their constitution, it is decided and imposed 
on them by those already in rulership positions. 
Owing to the need for an ideal constitution (one which emanates from the 
people themselves), and for democracy to succeed in Nigeria and 
elsewhere, the errors in the constitution-making processes must be 
corrected. It should be made to function ideally, incorporating both the 
political and legal aspects of its provisions. Where this is achieved, it 
would help to protect the individuals against violations of their right as 
well as against unjust regimes. 
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